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INTRODUCTION 
The Internet has become indispensable and plays an important role in our life today, in many 
things we depend on the Internet. While the Internet gives us easy access to almost all open 
information, convenience and promptness, we are exposed to the various problems of security, 
usually called eyber crimes. 
One of the problems is denial of service (DoS) attack. DoS attacks are different from system 
penetration attacks to steal information or destroy system in that DoS attacks consume the 
resources of target host or network by flooding with an amount of anonymous packets, 
thereby preventing legitimate access to the target host or network, resulting in loss of 
transactions with clients and credibility. Many well known Web sites like . , eBay, Yahool, 
and Amazon have suffered from distributed denial of service (DDo ) attacks. In DOo attacks, 
the attacker uses a number of compromised hosts residing on different networks to intensitY 
the flooding and make it hard to detect the attacker. Several automated ODoS attack tools such 
as 5tacheldraht and TFN have been developed and (D)Do attacks have become more 
prevalent recently due to the relative ease of acquiring and executing such attacking tools and 
their near untraceability to the attacker. In (0)D05 attacks attackers hide their real identity by 
forging the source Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of attacking packets, and they generate the 
addresses randomly. 
If we had a mandatory mechanism to prevent the use of incorrect source address, then we 
would never bear about (D)Dos attack. Unfortunately we do not have any and the anonymous 
nature of the IP protocol makes it difficult to identify the true source of an IP' packet if the 
source uses fake address. Many routers use ingress f1ltering [4] to limit source address of [P' 
packets coming from the stub network to addresses belonging to that network. Each router is 
configured to block packets that arrive with illegitimate source addresses. This technique is 
most feasible in customer networks or at the border of Internet service providers (lSPs) where 
address ownership is re[atively unambiguous and traffic load is low. However, some existing 
services such as network address translators (NATs), mobil IF and unidirectional link. 
technology for hybrid satellite architectures depend on source address spoofing. Therefore it is 
difficult to prevent (D)DoS attacks fundamentally but there are two ways to deal with (D)DoS 
attacks, the one is to detecting and discarding attacking packets on the way to their destinations, 
and the other is IP traceback to find the real source of attacking packets and then possibly 
make the attacker (criminal person) responsible. 
Even though it is not easy to detect the actual attacker (host and person), if a victim could find 
the path of attacking packets in real-time, it would be much easier to quickly stop the attack. 
and the possession of capability to trace back wouLd somewhat deter attackers from launching 
(D)DoS attacks. The problem of traceback of spoofed packets has become a topic as a measure 
against (D)DoS attacks, and it will remain a topic in the Internet world. We believe that it is 
worthy of study of the methods of IF traceback for the analysis of packet routing. 
Chapter II provides brief explanation of existing techniques and chapter III proposes a new
 
technique that uses Huffman codes to mark packets with router's information as packets
 
traverse routers during the journeys to reach their destinations. In hapters IV and V
 







Various ideas for IP traceback have been proposed and orne of them are practically used to 
determine the path that attacking packets pass through. We can basically categorize them into 
link testing, marking, logging, and Internet Control Message Protocol ([CMF) traceback 
messages 
1. ICMP Traceback Messages 
When a router forwards packets it samples packets with a low probability, and if a packet is 
sampled, the router creates ICMP traceback message with the content of the sampled packet 
and router's information, and send the messages to the destination of the sampled packet. With 
enough traceback messages from enough routers along the path, the attacking path can be 
determined. 
2. Link Testing 
The link testing tests all possible upstream routers of a router that is already known to be 
carrying the attacking packets to find out from which one the packets are coming in. For 
example, in Figure 1 at router m the only possible upstream is 1 (k), and at router k the possible 
upstream links are 1 (i), 3 (n), 4 (1) and 5 (0). After Link lei) has been determined by link testing 
at router k, the upstream links leg) and 30) of router i will be tested. We can test a possible 
upstream Link by dropping all packets addressed to the victim for a second or so and seeing if 
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there is a break in incoming packets at the victim, or by flooding a link [3] with a large burst of 
traffic, the packets traveling across the flooded link will have an increased probability of being 
dropped, and then observing the changes in the rate of attacking packets. Another test is by 
using the feature called input debugging which make it possible to filter particular packets on 
some egress port and determine which ingress port they arrived on. The victim creates a 
signature consisting of common features contained in all attacking packets and sends a query 
including the signature to each router along the path as routers are determined hop by hop 
from the closest router to the victim. Drawbacks are that tests can only be done during an 
ongoing attack, and cooperation and attention of intervening routers' operators are required. 
Furthermore, the execution of a link testing could be another DoS attack toward the link that is 
being tested. 
3. Marking 
In this method routers append or add their IP address information to th pack ts, and th 
victim can construct the attacking path by examining the added address information. The naive 
marking is Node Append in which every router append its IP address to all packets it forwards 
consequently increasing packet size 
3.1 Node Sampling 
To reduce the size of packet and tbe overhead of the ode Append, each router samples 
packets with some probability to mark the packets with its address. The address written by a 
router may be overwritten by another router that a packet passes through later. As the distance 
between a router and the victim increases, the victim needs to receive more packets to receive a 
packet marked by the router: 
3.2 Edge Sampling [5] 
In this sampling, a packet has three marking fields: start, end and distance. tart and end will 
denote an edge between two adjacent routers on the path, and distance will show the distance 
from the edge to the victim. If a router decides to mark a packet according to the some 
probability, then it marks the start field with its IP address, and set the distance to zero. If it 
decides not to mark the start field and distance is zero, then it marks the end field with its IP 
address, thus representing an edge between itself and its upstream router. Whenever the router 
does not mark the start field it increments the distance. This method is very robust to multiple 
attacks but requires additional space in the packet header compared to ode sampling. 
3.3 XOR-Encoding of Edge Sampling [5] 
To reduce the space required by edge sampling that requires three marking fields, packets have 
two marking fields called edge (start) instead of two (start and end), and a distan e field. The 
field edge will be the result of operation XOR of two adjacent routers addr sses. Marking 
decision procedure is same as edge sampling except when router marks the end field it does 
operation XOR with its IP address and the value of edge (start) field and then write the result 
to the edge field. 
3.4 Advanced Markings of XOR Encoding [2] 
As an advanced marking scheme of sampling, this scheme uses Identification field of an IP 
packet for marking. The field is divided into a 5-bit distance field and an II-bit edge field, and 
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instead of using IF addresses themselves it uses the outputs of bash functions with IF addresses 
as inputs. Two different hash functions are u ed for start and end IF addre s. 
Another advanced marking scheme is using two sets of hash functions, each set is for start and 
end [P address respectively, and there are three fields (flag identification, distance and edge) for 
marking. A hash function requires two parameters (IP address and flag identification) as inputs. 
The purpose of flag identification is to specify which hash function to use in a hash set, and the 
meaning of other fields are same as in XOR-encoding. When an end router calculates hash 
value it must use the same flag identification as the preceding (start) router used. 
4. Logging 
In this method routers stores information, for some period of time because of the limit of 
space, about all packets they forward. When a victim traces back a packet, the victim checks all 
stored information in all adjacent routers to determin which one forwarded the packet, after 
the one has been determined then checks again all adjacent upstream routers to dle determined 
one. 
4.1 Hash based IP Traceback []] 
In this approach they devised a system called Source Path Isolation Engine ( PIE) consisting 
of Data Generation Agents (DGAs), SPIE Collection and Reduction Agents (SCARs) and a 
SPIE Traceback Manager ( 1M) for a network which consists of many sulrnetworks and 
routers. Each router has a DGA associated with it. The DGA produces a message digest of 
each packet as it departs the router, and stores the digests for some period of time, and the 
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digests can be transferred to a SCAR for a long term storage and anal sis. SCARs are 
responsible for a particular region of network, serving as data concentration points for several 
routers. The STM controls the whole PIE system and is the interface to the intrusion 
detection system or other entity requesting a traceback. 
A traceback begins when a traceback request arrives at STM, TM sends a query consisting of 
packet, egress point (the last router packet passed), and time of receipt to a SCAR responsible 
for the victim's region of the network. The SCAR responds with a partial attack path and the 
packet as it entered the region (it may have been transformed, possibly multiple times, within 
the region), and a node at the edge of the SCAR's region. STM sends a query to another 
SCAR that is abutting that edge node. This process continues until all branches of attack path 
terminate, either at a source within a region mana~d by a SCAR. or at the edge of the entire 
SPIE system. 
When a SCAR determines a router that forwarded a pack t, the CAR searches the digests 
stored in its DGA for the digest of the packet and if the digest is found in a DGA associated 
with a router, the packet is assumed to have passed through the router. This approach requires 





NEW MARKING SCHEME USING HUFFMAN CODES 
This new idea utilizes the following facts. First, routers are able to know which physical 
network interface port packets arrive on, this ability is used in ingress filtering and input 
debugging of routers. Second, each router is connected with not so many adjacent routers, in a 
router-level Internet map the average degree (the number of neighboring routers of a router) is 
3.15 [81. 
There are two differences in the new method from other marking methods. Firstly when a 
router marks a packet with address information, the information is not of the router that is 
marking but of a router which sent the packet to the current router, and secondly it uses a 
special table called link table, which shows all the links between the router and its adjacent 
routers. The router append to the markin.g field a Huffman codeword representing the link 
number of the link (router) through which the packet arrived. 
When the marking field of a packet becomes short of space left to append the corresponding 
Huffman codeword for the link number, the router stores the content of the marking field with 
a message digest of the packet into the router's local memory, and then clears the field and 
appends the codeword. The stored link sequence can be retrieved via the message digest of the 
packet from the intermediate router during an fP traceback procedure. 
igure 1 illustrates an atta king cenario, in which the at:ta king path i [a,e g,i,k,m] and the 
sequence of link numbers is [1,3,2,1,1.1], and OITe ponding sequence of Huffman codewords 
is [0,11,10,0,00,0] according to the link table in Table 1. Decoding pro ess can be optimized 
by appending Huffman codes in reverse order, therefore the acruaJ sequenc of Huffman 
codewords is [0,11,01,0,00,0]. 


















1 a:local 0 1 g 0 1 i a 
2 e 10 2 f 10 2 e 10 
I 3 b 110 3 a 11 I 3 h 11 
4 c 111 
Link table Link table 
Link table for router e for router g 
for router a 
Link Link link Link Link Link
Router Router Router 
* Code :tt Code :# Code 1 g a 1 i 00 1 k a 
2 k 10 2 m 01 2 m:local 1 
3 j 11 3 n 10 Link table 
Link table 4 I 110 f r router m 
for router i 5 0 111 
Link table 
for router k 
Table I. Link tables for routers a, e, g, i, k and m of the attacking path of Figure I. Link codes 
are of variable length, and a, b, C, ... , n are abbreviations for [p addresses of the routers. 
II 
1. Encoding of Marking Field 
Figure 2 shows encodings of 32-bit marking field, in format (a) marking field is divided into a 
I-bit saved flag (slJ, a 26-bit link sequence (Is) and a 5-bit length of link sequence (Us), in format 
(b) it is into a I-bit saved flag (slJ and a 31-bit link sequence (15). To reduce the possibility that 
the marking field has to be stored at intermediate routers I local memory, it is required to assign 
a longer field to the link sequence. So instead of using Us to specify the length of bitstring 
(sequence of link codes) in the field Is, we use bit I as a delimiter with leading Os to designate 
the start position of the valid bitstring. When a packet passes through a router, Is is augmented 
with a codeword that represents a link through which the packet came in. Before appending 
the reversal of the codeword at the right end of Is, the router checks if there is enough bit-space 
left in 15 to append the codeword by counting the leading Os before the delimiter in 15. 
(a) 
0 Link Sequence (Is) lis ...... 
1 hit 5 hits 
(b)
 
B Link Sequence (Is)
 .. ... 
1 hil 11 hits 
sf : Saved flag Us: Length of Hnk sequence 
Figure 2. Encoding of the marking field. Format (a) uses lis to specify the length of bitstring in 
Is, while format (b) uses a delimiter bit I at the leftmost of the valid sequence of link codes in Is. 
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Marking procedure at a router: 
Determine a link that packet P came from, and a Huffman codeword representing the link by 
consulting the link table. 
if (sf== 1 and packet P(old_P) transformed into a d.ifferent packet (new_P» 
then store MD(new_P):MD(old_P)(sf,ls) Iistore at local memory 
Is= OxOI Ilclear Is by setting with 000 ... 01 
jf (space_left < length(codeword» I III not enough space left in link sequence(ls) 
then store MD(P):(sf,ls) I IMD(p): message digest of packet p 
sf= I, Is =OxO I Ilmarking field saved, Is cleared 
Append codeword to Is I I append codeword to the link sequence(ls) 
Figure 3. Marking procedure at a router with a pa ket P. 
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2. Storing Marking Fields at Intermediate Routers 
Because of the limited space of Is in the marking field we may not be able to store the complete 
link sequence of a path. After a router has determined that the bit-space left in the Is is not 
enough for appending a codeword, the router stores the contents of the marking field in its 
local memory, which is indexed by the message digest of the packet, denoted by MD(packet). 
After saving, Is will be cleared by setting with OxO I having only delimiter bit 1 at the rightmost 
bit, and sfis set to 1 indicating that the marking field is stored. 
Possible packet transformations 
If a packet undergoes a transformation after the marking has been saved (when sfis I), then a 
router can not retrieve the stored marking field unless it knows the message digest of the packet 
before the transformation. Therefore when sf is 1 and a transformation happens, a router 
should store a pair of digests of old and new packets MO(n w Pack t):MD(old Packet) along 
with the marking field, and clear Is by setting with OxOl, but sfremain 1. 
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Example of marking procedure: 
In-
Router Link CodeLink # 
1 1 0 
2 3 11 
3 2 10 
4 1 0 
5 1 00 
6 3 010 
7 4 001 











Saving of Marking Field 
MD(P4):01 011 01 0 
MD(Ps):MD(P5) 10000100 
MD(P7):11010100 
Assumption: Length of Marking Field is 8 bits, I bit for sf, 7 bits for Is 
MD(Pk) =Message digest of packet P at router k before marking 
Figure 4. An example of marking: The first bit I in /s is a deUmiter that indio ates the start of 
sequence of the reversals of link codes. At router 5, 6 and 8 the marking fi ld is saved. t 
router 6 sf is 1 and the packet transforms into a dHferent new packet, therefore router 6 saves 
the marking field with a pair of digests of old and new packets, and then marks the marking 
field. Link codes are appended at th.e end of Is in reverse bit-order. 
15 
~,.".--------
3. Traceback Procedure 
Starting from a router that is directly connected with a victim. the victim can traceback a 
packet by decoding the link sequence (/5) in the marking field of the packet. When decoding a 
codeword the victim consults the link table of current router to find the upstream router that 
forwarded the packet to the current router. After a codeword has been decoded, Is will be right­
shifted times of the length of the decoded cordword. When /5 become 1 (only with a deLimiter 
at the rightmost bit) and sf is I. the stored marking field sbould be retrieved via the message 
digest of the packet. ow the upstream router becomes current router and the traceback 
continues until Isbecomes 1 and sfbecomes O. 
Hi 
",...",,-----------------­
Traceback procedure at a victim with a packet P: 
Starting at the closest router (current router) that the victim is connected directly with 
While (1) 
Print current router 
Construct Huffman tree with the Link table of current router 
Decode one Huffman codeword from the right end of 15 by using the tree 
Find the router that the decoded codeword represents 
if (Is == OxO 1 and s.f-== 1) / / marking field is stored at current router's memory 
then retrieve MD(p):MD(pre_p)(sf,ls) or MD(p):(sf,ls) 
reset sf, Is with retrieved values 
if (/s ==OxOl and s.f-==O) 
then break / /stop traceback, no mor .Iink sequen e to decode 
Set current router with the found router 
Figure 5. Traceback procedure at a victim with a packet P 
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4. Representation of Links 
To reduce the length of the marking field in the lP packet header and the times link sequence 
has to be stored in intermediate routers due to the lack of space left in the marking field during 
the marking procedure, we use Huffman codes, which is widely used to compress data by 
assigning shorter codewords to higher-frequency characters and longer codewords to lower-
frequency characters, to represent the link numbers. For a router, each link between itself and 
one of its adjacent routers has a relative number (frequency) of packets coming into the router 
through the link, and using the frequencies of packets we can assign a Huffman codeword to 
each link. Table 2 shows an example where the number of links is five and the average number 
of bits to represent a link with unequal distribution is 2.04 while fixed-length representation 
requires 3 bits. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate two Huffman tree each with equal and unequal 
distribution of packets among 5 links of a router of Table 2. 
Link Number 1 2 3 4 5 
Unequal Distribution 45 34 10 8 3 
Equal Distribution 255 255 255 255 255 
Fixed-Length Codes 000 001 010 011 100 
Huffman Codes for ­




110 11 1 00 01 10Equal Distribution 
Table 2. An example of distribution and corresponding codes for links with degree 5. 
18 
Figure 6. The Huffman tree for the unequal distribution of Table 2. Frequencies of packets 
arriving through each Link are respectively 45, 34. 10. 8 and 3. The compression rate over the 
fixed-length representation is 61.2% ((45 *lbit + 34 * 2bits + 10 * 3bits + 8 * 4bits + 3 * 4bits) 
I (45 + 34 + 10 + 8 + 3) * 3bits). 
Figure 7. The Huffman tree for the equal distribution of Table 2. Frequencies of packets 
arriving through each Link are all the same with 255. The compression rate over the fixed­
length representation is 80% ((20 * 2bits + 20 * 2bits + 20 * 2bits + 20 * 3bits + 20 * 3bits) 1(45 
+ 34 + 10 + 8 + 3) * 3bits). 
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5. Organization of Link Tab1 
The link table of a router is a fil tha is uppo ed to a ed a vi tim to d od a 
Huffman codeword to fmd an upstream router on th attaclcing path. All routers must have 
agreed structure for their link tables. 
Figure 8 shows a possible tructure of a Link table. In th tructure, number of links is th 
number of adjacent routers dir tly onne ted with a router and th frequency of each link i 
the relative number of packets oming through the link. The number of links and frequencies 
of each link are represented by one byte for each. and IF addr ss of router are 4-bytes long. 
Number IP IP IPFrequency Frequency 
, 
Frequencyof links .. address address ... addressof link 1 of link 2 of link k (k) of fink 1 of fink 2 of fink k 





6. Encoding of Marking Field in the IF Header 
Some fields of IP header must be used as the marking field. The Option field of IP packet 
looks most adequate but in [5] Sabege uses the Identification field of IP header to store path 
information on account of that less than 0.25% of packets undergo fragmentation [7]. If the IP 
Identification field is used for marking then the original function (reassembling fragmented 
packets by inspecting the Identification field of packets) of the field will be impeded. And 
using the Option field is not supported practically because the Option field has rarely been used 
in reality and most of routers that are running currently in the Internet cannot handle the 
Option field. Even though they could handle the Option field there remain still other problems 
like increasing possibility of fragmentation of packets due to increased size by using the 
Option field, because basically the Option field does not have an assigned fLXed length space in 
IP header as its name means literally. Therefore this study does not propose a certain field to 
use for the marking field. 
7. The Message Digest Algorithm 
When routers store a marking field it will index the marking field with a message digest of the 
packet. If we choose a message digest algorithm with longer output (64-bits or 128-bits) then 
routers need to have more memory space to store the digest with along a marking field. Using 
one of existing digest algorithms with adequate output length is the easiest way. There are 
many message digest algorithms and if we adopt MD5 [11) then we can use only 32 bits of 124 
output bits, for example by selecting every forth bit of the output. 
As explained later in the memory requirement section of the results of simulation, at a high­
end router with capacity of I Tera bit/sec with I-minute period of keeping of marking fields, 
--------------
the number of 32-bit marking fields that has to be stored is 1200 Mega. Therefore with 32-bit 
marking field, the probability that a message digest collides with a stored one is 1.214 because 
there are 4 Giga digests with 32 bits long. 
Fields of IF packets to be used as input of the message di~t algorithm 
When routers compute a digest MD(P) of a packet P, the input of the digest algorithm is not 
the whole packet, only some parts of the packet are used to reduce the processing time and 
because some fields of IF header changes as the packet passes through routers. In []] as shown 
in Figure 9 TIL, ToS, Options, and Checksum of IF header will be masked out before 
digesting, and the first 8 bytes of the payload are used as input. But for the new marking 
scheme, in addition to the fields masked out in Figure 9, fields that are used for marking field 
a.re masked out too before digesting. 
Version I Header Length I Type of Service Total Leng1h 
Identification I~ I~ I Fragment Offset 







Payload ( First 8 bytes)
 
Figure 9. The fields of an IP packet. Fields in gray are masked out before digesting, including 
the type of service, time to live (TTL), and IP options fields (adopted from [I)). 
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8. Compromised lntermediate Routers 
In a (0)D05, there are possibl compromis d intermediat routers on th path of attacking pack ts, 
and they could mes up or car full manipulate the marking field of a pack t. HO\· ever 
compromised routers cannot affect the marking after them and the victim can traceback correct! at 
least up to a compromised router that is the closest to the victim on the path. 
IV 
SIMULATION 
Simulation has been done to see whether new idea works correctly and analyze mainly 
memory requirement of the new idea. To imjtate a packet flow in the Internet, frrst a packet, 
not a real IP packet but a data structure having a marking field, is cr ated, then this packet 
tTaverses a certain number of routers (hops). Before the packet reache a router the router is 
created by assigning an IP address, a link table including degree (number of links), IP 
addresses of neighboring routers that links connect with the router, and distribution of packets 
(frequencies) among the links, then Huffman codes for the links are constructed by creating a 
Huffman tree using the distribution, and one of the links is chosen randomly assuming that the 
packet comes in through the chosen link. Finally it marks the packet with a Huffman codeword 
representing the chosen link. 
When a packet reaches its destination, IP traceback of thi packet may be accomplished from 
the last router. During a traceback, at each router, a Huffman tree is created with packet 
distribution, and one codeword is decoded from the marking field of the packet. With the 
decoded information the next upstream router's JP address is found consulting the link table of 
the current router. The traceback continues at the found router until there is no link sequence 
left in the marking field. 





Huffman codes for the links, such as distance, degree. length of Huffman codes, and length of 
complete link sequence were collected. 
1. Average Lengths of Huffman Codes and Link Sequences 
The average length of codewords increases in proportion to the average degree. Table 3 and 
Figure 10 shows the average length of codewords for degrees from 2 to 6. For average degree 3, 
the average length is 1.44 and 1.56 bits for unequal distribution and equal distribution 
respectively, and for average degree 4 it is 1.77 and 1.95 bits. In equal distribution all links of a 
router were given 255 the same frequency of incoming packets, and in unequal distribution the 
frequency of incoming packets through each link is differently given in the range of 1-255 by 
random. 
Average Degree 2 3 4 5 6 
Equal 
1.00 1.56 1.95 2.23 2.47 
Average Length Distribution 
of Codewords Unequal 
1.00 1.44 1.77 2.03 2.26 
Distribution 
Table 3. Average length of Huffman codewords with average degrees 2,3,4,5, and 6. 
Figures 11 and 12 show the average length of complete link sequence with unequal and equal 
packet distribution among links. As like average length of Huffman codes, the average length 
of link sequence increases in proportion to the average degree and the distance (hop). The 
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average length of link sequence with average degree 3. distance 16 and unequal packet 
distribution is 23.11 bits, and 24.95 bits with equal distribution. 
2. Memory Requirement for Routers to Store Marking Fields 
Memory requirement was analyzed for each 32-bit and 16-bit long marking field with equal 
incoming packet distribution among links because we cannot ensure that the routers' link 
tables are optimally tuned with the actual packet distribution. But the simulation has been 
done with each equal and unequal distribution. In equal distribution all the links were given 
the same frequency 255 of incoming packets, and in unequal distribution the links were given 
different frequencies in the range of 1- 255 randomly. 
32-bit marking field 
Almost all paths are less than 32 hops and the average length of path (number of hop) i 
around 16 [9], and the average degree (average number of neighbors of a router) is slightly 
larger than 3 [8]. Therefore using 32 bits for marking field. with distan e ]6 hop and average 
number of links 3. the average length of complete sequence of link codes is 23.]] bits in Figure 
11 and the probability that the marking field has to be stored is 0.002 in Figure 13 with unequal 
packet distribution among links. But with equal distribution where all the frequencies are same 
with 255, the average length of sequence of link codes is 24.95 bits in F.igure ]2 that is a little 
larger than that with. unequal distribution, while the probability of saving of the marking field 
is 0.001 in Figure 14 because the length of Huffman codes is a little longer with Ilog 2 III bits or 




average length of Huffman codes with unequal distribution is always less than with rlog 2 °1 
bits. 
In Figure 12 with average degree 3 at distance 21, the average length of complete sequence of 
link codes exceeds 30 bits that is the length of Is in the marking field and consequently the link 
sequence has to be stored. Therefore the probability that the marking field of a packet with 
average distance 16 and average degree 3 is stored at least once on the way to its destination is 
about 12/32 (distance 21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31 and 32 out of 32 distances) that 
is 0.375 (The area in Figure 18 is about 1/3). And the probability that a router on the path of 
16 routers stores the marking field approximates to 0.375/16, which means that 2.34% of 
marking fields are stored at a router. 
With average degree 4, the probability that marking field is stored at least once is 16/32 = 0.5 
(distance 17, 18, ... , 32 out of 32 distances) because at distan e 17 the average link sequence 
exceeds 30bits and the area in Figure 18 is about 1/2. The probability of saving of marking 
field at a router out of average 16 routers is 0.5/16 = 3.1 %. 
Since the actual average degree in the Internet is between 3 and 4, the percentage of packets 
whose marking field is stored at a router is inferred less than 3%. And furthermore, as the 
distances of paths are distributed around 16 as shown in Figure 17 if we apply different 
weights according to their distribution the actual percentage will drop to less than 2%. 
A high-end core router with capacity of 1 Tera bps that is 1 Giga packets/sec with assumption 
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that average packet size is 1 Kbits will store 20M marking fields per second. The memory 
required for the router is 160MB/sec (20M * 64bits / 8bits), whi h is 0.128 % of router's 
capacity for keeping of marking fields for a second, and 7.68% for a minute. For a low-end 
router with capacity 1Gbps the requirement is 9.6 MB/min. 
16-bit marking field 
Figures 15 and 16 show the average count of savings of 16-bit marking field with each unequal 
and equal distribution, and Figure 18 shows only with degrees 3 and 4 with equal distribution 
of incoming packets among links. The average count of savings of marking field of a packet is 
about 2 according to Figure 19 with degree between 3 and 4. And even if we apply hop 
distribution (Figure 15) to Figure 18, the actual average count of savings will be some 2. The 
average count of savings of a packet at a router of 16 routers is 2116, which is 0.125 meaning 
that marking fields of 12.5% of packets that a router forwards are stored at this router. The 
memory requirement for a router with capacity of 1 Giga bps is 750KB/sec (0. 125M * 
(32+ 16)bits / 8bits) which is 0.6% of router's capacity for a second keeping and 36% for a 
minute. 
Transformations 
Transformation did not affect on the average length of codewoTds and the memory 
requirements due to the percentage of packets that undergo transformation is generally low, in 
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Figure 10. Average length of Huffman codewords for average degrees 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 with one 
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Figure 11. Average length of sequence of Link codes with unequ distribution of pa kets 
among links. Links were given different frequencies in the range of 1- 255 randomly and 
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igure 12. verage length of sequence of link codes with equal distribution of pa kets 
among links. Every Link was given 255 the same frequency of packe . and one percentage 
of packets transformed. 
Figure )3. verage count of savings of 32-bit marking fieJd of packet during its traveJ 
with unequaJ distribution of packets among the links. Links were given different 
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Figure 14. Average count of savings of 32-bit marking field with equal distribution f 
packets among the links. Every link was given same fr quency of packets with 255, and 
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Figure 15. verage count of savings of 16-bit marking field of a pa ket with unequal 
distribution of packets among the links during its travel. Links were giv n different 
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igure 16. Average count of savings of 16-bit marking field of a packet with equal 
distribution of packets among the links during its travel. Every link was given same 
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Figure ]8. Average count of savings of 32-bit marking field of a packet with averag degre s 3 
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Figure 19. Average count of savings of 16-bit marking field of a pa ket with averag d grees 3 
and 4 • with on percentage of packet transform and equal packet distribution among Links. 
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3. Comparison with Other Methods 
./ Can trace both during an ongoing attack or postmortem 
Like other marking methods this new method allows a victim traceback a packet both 
during an attack and after an attack has been completed, provided that the link sequence 
still remains in intermediate routers in case that intermediate routers stored the sequence. 
./ Can construct a path of any packet correctly 
With this method we can construct a path of any packet regardless of whether it is an 
attacking packet or not, meaning that the method does not require amount of packets to 
construct a path, only one packet is enough. 
./ Can construct all paths of DDoS attacks correctly 
Packets of different attack paths will have different Hnk sequen es and 
be decoded into a different attacking path . 
ach sequence can 
./ Requires less computation to traceback 
Compared to probabilistic markings or hash based logging, the new method can easily 
construct a path of a packet provided that it can access Link tables of intermediate routers. 
./ Requires smaller amount of space than other loggings 
This method requires about a third of amount of space required in hash based logging to 
store marking fields along with message digests in intermediate routers. 
40 
v' Requires local memory to store marking fields 
It is essential for routers to have enough memory to store marking fields e en though the 
memory requirement is less than that of other method. The requirement increases in 
proportion to the period of keeping of marking fields 
v' Adds overhead of marking to routers 
It is a load for routers to maintain a link table and that the table must be correct and well 
optimized, and it is an issue how to enforce or impose an obligation of keeping and 
managing the table to all routers. 
./ Vulnerable to I-bit error 
The new idea requires aU routers a packet pass through to mark, and if one of internal 
router does not mark or if there is at least a I-bit error in the marking field of a packet th.en 
the traceback of the packet will fail. It is a characteristic of a variable length codes lj~ 
Huffman codes that if one of bit is inverted or missing by error then carre t decoding 
(expanding) of the encoded (compressed) bit string is impossible from the codeword 





PRACTICAL ISSUES FOR THE NEW SCHEME
 
Management of link tables 
Each router must maintain a correct link table and provides victims with the table when asked 
for access. Link tables should be optimized as well as possible to reflect the correct distribution 
of packets coming into the routers from its adjacent routers. 
It will be an issue how to enforce or impose an obligation of keeping and managing tables to 
all routers. We may authorize a certain system or an organization to collect all the link tables 
and manage them: checking correctness and controlling access to the tables. This collection of 
tables will be a whole router-level Internet map. If the configuration of links of a router 
changes then the link table should be updated promptly and pr vious link table must be 
preserved for some period of time such that a victim can access the previous table and d code a 
link code marked by the router. Each previous table must be annotated with starting and 
ending dates and times. 
Local memories of routers 
Many current routers are not equipped with a hard disk and do not have enough main memory 
to store marking field for a certain period of time, that is to say one minute or so. 
The ability to know on what link packets arrive 
Every router can satisfy the assumption that is capable to know from whicl1link packets arrive 
on. But the function to figure out from which neighbor sent a packet to it must be don 
automatically upon arrival of the packet, and the packet must be tagged with the link 
.information until it is marked by the embedded program of a router. 
Packet transformations 
A packet can be transformed more than once dur.ing its journey by .internal routers. To trace a 
packet that was transformed from another packet back up to routers before the transformation. 
the marking field of old packet must be copied into new packets. Some protocols of 
transformation like IeMP copy the contents of the IP header of previous packet into the data 
field of new packets. 
VI. 
CO CLU 10 SAND F TURE WORK 
It is difficult to trace a packet back to its source with current [p version 4.0. From the 
beginning the Internet was not designed and implemented with tracebacks in mind, needless to 
say when people started building the Internet they had not imagined situations where 
tracebacks are needed. 
Current IP header is not appropriate for marking, using either the Identification field or the 
Option field of IP header has its own limitation. Therefore this study does not suggest specific 
fields in IP header to use for marking, but suggests and analyzes a new marking technique with 
two different sizes of marking field, 16-bits and 32-bits. 
The new idea proposed in this study requires routers to have enough memory space regardless 
of whether it is a hard disk or a main memory to store marking fields for a certain period of 
time in accordance with the amount of traffic. However most of routers have been doing their 
jobs without a local hard disk or even with a small main memory, so they have to be equipped 
with a secondary memory to store marking fields. In hash based logging [1] they attach a DGA 
(Data Generation Agent) to a router to store information of packets the router forwards. 
The scheme presented in this study is to mark every packet at routers so that every packet will 
have information about intermediate routers between source (attacker) and destination (victim). 
·14 
It may be worth thinking over whether it is necessary to generate JP trac back information for 
ali packets regardless of whether it is a marking or a logging. [n probabilistic markin~ routers 
do not mark all packets but sample packets to mark because packe cannot keep all the 
router's IP information due to the limited space of the marking field in IP header. To lessen the 
marking load of routers and to decrease the size of the marking field in IP header probabilistic 
marking can be applied to the new scheme. 
Moreover it is necessary to deliberately select fields of IP header to use as an input of the 
message digest so that routers do not need to store MD(oldP):MD(newP)(sf,ls) in case that a 
transformation does not change the fields of IP header that are used as inputs of the message 
digest. For instance the Identification field is used in fragmentation transformation, and if 
routers do not use the Identification field and data portion as inputs when calculating the 
digest to store a marking field because of lacking of space in the link sequence field (/5), routers 
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unsigned int mf32; II(MSB is sf{saved flag), rest 31-bits are for Is(link sequence» 
Ilfot analysis 
iot saved_times; Iinot a part of packet, only to count the time mf is saved 
int Is_length; Iinot a part of packet, only to find the length of compl te Link sequen e 
}; 










/lfoT huffinan codes 
struct hLcode 
{ 
unsigned short bits; Ilcodeword (.....xxxxxxxx) , x is 1 or 0 










/ /link table 
iot links; /Inumber of links(adjacent routers) 
unsigned int frq[29]; Iionly first links-frq are valid 
unsigned int 1_[Paddr[29]; Iionly first links-IPaddresses are valid /Imax num of links =29 
struet hLcode code[29); Ilooly first links-codewords are valid fot links-links 
}; 
void Marking(int r, struct packet &p, int in_link, int tf);
 




VOId AsslgnHuffmanCode2Link(int router, unsigned codeword, int length, int node);
 
Jnt CountAvailOfLS( unsigned fit Is);
 











struet router R[36]; I/max 36 routers 
struet hCnode Node[58l; Ilmax 29 links(terminal nodes) --> max 57 node + 1 
unsigned int Path[36]; IlwiO be filled by TracebackO,(list of IP addres es of routers 00 the path of a 
packet) 
int Path_length; Iinumber of routers on the path, set by TracebackO 
#define TFs 5 
iot TF_ratio[TFs] ={l ,5,10,20,30}; 110.1, 0.5,1,2,3% each 
#define MaxDistance 36 IIdistance is I - 36 
#define MaxAvgLinks 6 /Iaverage number of links is 2 - 6 
#define MarkingFieldl6 16 /Imarking field is 16 bits long 
#define MarkingField32 32 /Imarking field is 32 bits long 
iot MarkingField =MarkingField32; 
iot DoTrace = 0; I/if DoTrace= I then afer a packet has reached its destination, the destination will do 
the TraceBack of the packet 
//1//1/11/1/1//11/11///1/1///11//////11/111111///11////11/1/1///11 
/ /for analysis 
/111/11//1//1/////////////////1//1//////1111111/11//1////1/11//1/1 
#define Trys 1000 /Inumber of packets to test 
/ /Iength of link sequence of Trys-packets 
unsigned int LLS[2J[TFsHMaxDistance][MaxAvgLinks-l) ITrys); 
/ /LLS[O) is with uniform distribution( same frequencies of packets from each links of a router) 
/ /LLS[I] is with not uniform / / (different / I 
/ /Times the marking field has to be saved during th journey of a .eacket toward its de tination 
unsigned int SavedTimes(2][TFs][MaxDistance][MaxAvgLinks-l] lTrys]; 
/Iaverage of 1000 packets 
float AvgLLS[2][TFs][MaxDistance][MaxAvgLinks-I]; 
float AvgSavedTimes[2) [TFsJ [MaxDistance] [MaxAvgLinks-I]; 
I/average length of Huffman codeword 
float AvgLCW[2)[TFs][MaxAvgLinks-l); 












sprintf(msg, "Frq_Type TF(%%) Distance Av~links 
Times_Saved\n"); 




/* Seed the random-number generator with current time so tbat 
* the numbers will be different every time we run. 
*/
 
srand«unsigned)time( NULL ) );
 
for(int frq_type=O; frq_type <2; frq_type++) 
r 








printf(" t=%d,av8-links=%d\n" ,t,av8-links); 
for (distance = I; distance <= MaxDistan e/*36*/; distance ++)
: 




p.mfl2 = OxOOOOOOOl; / /sf = 0; Is = ULL; / /initialize packet as it is departing 
the source host 
p.saved_times = 0; 
p.lUength = 0; / /length of complete link sequence incIudeing stored link 
sequences 
/Ipacket p traverses routers 
int cur_router; I/index of currenet router 




/ /create a router and a link table for it 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
R[r].stored_rnf32 = OxOOOOOOOO; 
int links = (randO % (2*avgJin -3» + 2; 
R[r).links = links; 
for(int i=O; i<links;i++) 
I 
I 
R[r).1_IPaddr[i) = randO * randO; / /4-byte [P address of adjacent router 
// printf("IP:%08x ", R[r].UPaddr[i)); 
ittfrq_type==O) 
R[r].frq[i] = (randO % 255) + I; / / 1 - 255 
else 
R[r).frq[i] = 255; /Isame frequency for al11inks 
1/ printf("frq:%d ", R[r}.frq[il); 
/ /choose a io_link from links, assuming that the packet p came from this 
in_link 
/ Ito simulate an biased distribution(frq_type=O), a packet will be selected from 






int totaCdistribution(255 * 32J; 
for(i=O; i<links; i++) 
for(intj=O; j < R[r].frq[i); j++) 
totaCdistribution{total++] =i; 
in_link =totaLdistribution[ randO*randO % total];
 
II printf{"\nin_link=%dn , in_link);
 
} 
else in_link: =randO % links; 
I lIP address of proceeding router is the in_link-th router of current router 
if{r!=O) 
{ 
R[r-I].IPaddr = R[rJ.l_IPaddr[in_link]; 
Ilcreate Hulfman tree to a sign codewords to links 
lnt root =CreateHuffmanTree(r); Ilroot = i.ndex of root node 





int tf = o· 
if{ randO% (1000*TF_ratio[t)) ==O)IITF_ratio[0] = I =>0.1 % of packets 
undergo a transformation 
tf =1; Iitransformed 
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111/11 
Ilmarking packet p at router R[r] 
111111111111/111111111/111/111111111/1111/1111111111 
Marking(r, p, in_link, tf); 
}llfor each router packet p traverses 





SavedTimes[frq_type] [t][distance-I) [avg,Jinks-2] [0] = p.saved_times; 
111111111111111111/1111111111111111111111111111111/' 
/Ipacket p has traversed distance-routers 










for(int i=Path_length-l; i>=O; i-) 
{ 
printf{"%08x:" , Path(iJ); 
} 
printf{"path_length=%d,saved==%d times, Is 
length=%d\n",Path_length,p.saved_tim ,p.Is_length); 
Path_length = 0; 
}llif(DoTrace) 




Ilcalculate the averages of I1s and times 
for(n=O; n<Trys; n++) 
{ 
AvgLLS[ frq_type](tJldistance-I][avgJinks-2] += LLS[frct-typel(t] [distance­
11Iav!Llinks-211n] ; 
AvgSavedTimes(frq_type] [t] [distance-I) [av~links-2] += 
SavedTimes[frq_type) [t][distance-I] [av!Llinks-2] [0.]; 
} 
AvgLLS[frq_type)[t) [distance-l][av!Llinks-2] I=Trys; 
AvgSavedTimes[frq_type] It] [distance-l ][av!Llinks-2] I=Trys; 
AvgLCW[frq_type] [t] [av!Llin.ks-2] += AvgLLS[frq_type][t] [distance-I] [av~links-2); 
char msgfI20]; 
sprintf(msg, "Frq_Type TF(%%) Distance AV!Lhnks 
Times_Saved\n"); 
sprintf{msg, 
"%3d %3.1f %3d %3d %6.2f %5.3t\0", 
frq_~,. (floatJTF_ratio[t)/lO, distance, aV!Llinks, 
AvgLLS[frq_type] [tJ(distance-I] [av!Llinks-2], 
AvgSavedTimes[frq_type] [t)[distance-I) [avg.Jinks-2]); 
fwrite(msg, strlen(msg), I, outf); 
//////1//////11111111111111/11/11/1111/11/111111/11111IIIIIIIIIIII 
l/Ifor distance 
} Ilfor average links 
IlfoT analysis 
for(av!LLinks = 2; aV!Llinks <= MaxAvgLink 1*12*1; avg..Jinks++) 
{ 
AvgLCW[frq_type][tJ(avg.Jinks-2) 1= (37*18); Ilaverage length of a codeword 
sprintf(msg, "%3d %3.1f xxx %d %5.2f AvgLeng of 
a Codeword\n", 
aV!Llinks, AvgLCW[frq_type] [t] [av!Llinks­
2]); 








I I Marking() marks a oacket p at a router with link information 
***********'*********~*******************************************************I 
void Marking(int router, struct packet &p, int in_link, int tf) 
{ 
unsigned int Is, sf; 
sf =p.mf32 & Ox80000000;
 
Is = p.mf32 & Ox7fffffff;
 
Ilcheck if packet p has transformed into a new packet and sf is set to I
 
if{ sf && tf) Ilmarking field bad been stored before a transformation happened
 
0,I 






I I reset marking field of packet p
 
Is = OxOOOOOOOl; I lIs =NULL(only has the delimiter bit 1 in the right most position)
 
Ilcheck if enough space left in marking field
 
int left_bits = CountAvaiIOfLS(ls);
 
if(left_bits < R[router] .code[in_linkl.length) Illack of space in marking fi ld, 
I 
Iistore marking field at router r
 
R[router) .stored_mf32 = Is Isf;
 
p.saved_times++; 
Ilreset marking field of packet p 
sf = Ox80000000; II sf = I 
Is = OxOOOOOOOl; I lIs =NULL(only ha the delimiter bit I in the right most position) 
/Iappend a huffman codeword for in_link to the marking field 






CountAvailOfL 0 counts the available number of bi in 15 
******************************************************************************* /
int CountAvailOfLS( unsigned int Is) 
{ 
int left =0; 















Ilhuffmans codeword will be appended to the right end of marking field, 
Iitbe code is appended in reverse bit order 
IIEg. 1100100101 --> OO ... lxxx...xxxx.x1010010011 
*******************************************************************************1 
void AppendHFcode2LS(unsigned int &Is, int router, int in_link:) 
( 
( 






code = R(router] .code[in_link].bits;
 
length = R(router] .code[in_Iink].lengtb;
 














II TracebackO starts IF traceback of packet p from a router and recursively calls racebackO 
*******************************************************************************1 








Is =p.mf32 & Ox7ffffiff;
 
sf =p.m02 & Ox80000000;
 
Path[Path_Iength++) = R(routerl.IPaddr; Ilcurrent router's IP address 
Ilconstruct a huffman tree using distribution (frequencies of packets among links) 
mt node = CreateHuffinanTree(router); Iinode = index of root node 
Iidecode one codeword in marking field(ls) 
511 
while(node >= R(router].links) I I if th Dode i a terminal Dode, then one codeword from Is 
decoded 
{ 













node = ode(node].Ieft; 
Is»=1·
 
I Iif( C~untAvaiIOfLS(mf)) break;
 
Ilhere, node(index of NodeO) represents the link number
 
Iinow find the router that is connected by the link with current router
 




if( R(i] JPaddr == R[router] .CIPaddr(node] ) break; 
I lin this program, i is router-I,
 
Iia router R[i} is created after router R[i-lJ by the order packet p traverses
 
I Iso above for statement is not necessary and below can be just "Traceback(router-l, p);
 
lirouter R[i] is the upstream router of the current router R(router]
 
il\router!=O && i == router) {printf("proceeding router ot found(error in 1 data");} 
p.mf32 = Is I sf; 
Ilif no link codes are in Is and sf = 1 then retrieve the stored making field
 




else if(CountAvailOfLS(ls)==30 && !sf) I lalliink sequ n e has been decoded
 




CreateHuffmanTree() makes the Huffman tree from the frequency information and return 
the index of root node 
*******************************************************************************1 
int CreateHuffmanTree(int router) { 
int i, mini, min2, nextJree_node, links; 








ne.xtjree_node = links; II here, i==links 





for(i=O; i<nexcfree_oode; i++) { Illook over to find 2 min counts
 
if(Node[i] .frq !=O) { Ilfrq 0 means this node i already added to tree
 
if(Node[i).frq < ode[minI).frq) {
 




~Ise if(Node[i].frq < ode[min2).frq) minl = i; 
if(min2 == 57) break; Ilroot node is created and no more node left to be added 
Iinew node with weight of min1's + min2's
 
Node[ne.xcfree_oode).frq = ode[minl).frq + Node[minl].frq;
 
Node[rninl].frq = ode[min2].frq= 0; 1/2 nodes are added to the tree
 





return --nexcfree~node; Ilindex of root node 
1******************************************************************************* 
AssignHuffmanCode2LinkO finds and assigns Huffman codes to links (terminal nodes)
*******************************************************************************1 
void AssigoHuffmanCode2Link(int router, unsigned codeword, int length, int node) { 
int links = R[router].links; 










codeword «=I; / Ibitstring value
 




AssignHuffmanCode2Link(router, codeword II, length, Node[node].right); Ilcode: ...xxx =
 




Kyu Hyong Choi 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Master of Science 
Thesis: A NEW MARKI G SCHEME USING HUFFM CODES FOR 
IP TRACEBACK 
Major Field: Computer Science 
Biographical: 
Education: Graduated from Yungseng High School, Chonju, Korea in 1984; Received 
Bachelor of Engineering Degree in omputer ngin ering from Chonbuk adonal 
University, Chonju, Korea in February 1988; Completed the requirements for dl 
Master of Science degree with a major in Computer Science at Oklahoma tate 
University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in May 2003. 
Experience: Completed Military ervice as a Technicallnstru tor, Korean Air Fore , 
August 1989 to July 1992; Employed by Korean Government, Records and 
Archives Service, as a computer programmer and system administrator, Teajon, 
Korea, August 1992 to present. 
Professional Membership: The Korean Computer dentists and ngineers Association in 
America (KOCSEA). 
